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2 OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA 
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The recovery in the world economy from the deepest recession since the 1930s 
strengthened during the first half of 2010, aided by strong policy measures and 
restocking. The overall performance of the world economy, however, masks 
considerable variation in the extent of the economic recovery across different 
regions. China and the emerging economies have recorded the strongest 
growth rates while the recovery in the industrialised countries is progressing at 
a more modest pace as the legacy effects of the crisis weigh on the 
performance of these economies.  On the basis of the latest data available, we 
expect that the gradual weakening of the recovery seen in recent months will 
continue into 2011. For 2012, we expect world GDP growth to accelerate 
slightly as economic conditions gradually improve and economic growth slowly 
returns to its potential. 
 
As shown in Table 1, we anticipate that the recovery in output from the global 
economic crisis will proceed at a modest pace in 2011. World trade has been 
losing momentum throughout 2010 as the impact of exceptional monetary and 
fiscal stimuli begins to wane. The persistence of elevated risk premiums and 
the sovereign debt problems in Europe are obstructing the return to normality 
in financial markets which is necessary to underpin a broad-based economic 
recovery. High unemployment and the implementation of austerity measures 
to reduce large fiscal deficits built up during the crisis will weaken the pick-up 
in aggregate demand.  
 
The report contains the results of a simulation exercise which estimates the 
effects of fiscal policy changes on GDP in the Euro Area. In the absence of 
fiscal consolidation, GDP growth in the Euro Area would have been lower in 
2010. The planned consolidation measures for 2011-12 improve the public 
finances in the Euro Area by 1.7 per cent of GDP. At the same time, the 
implementation of the fiscal austerity measures will have a dampening effect 
on output with GDP growth slowing by perhaps ½ of a percentage point or 
more in both 2011 and 2012. The analysis highlights the high cost of elevated 
risk premia. Reverting to pre-recession levels of government risk premia could 
result in a substantial improvement in general government balances in the 
Euro Area.  
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For the Euro Area, we forecast a tentative recovery in output with GDP 
increasing by 1.6 per cent in 2011 and 1.7 per cent in 2012 following an 
increase of 1.7 per cent this year. There are several reasons for the relatively 
modest upturn projected for the Euro Area, including the unwinding of fiscal 
and monetary stimulus packages, sluggish private household demand, the 
ongoing repair of household balance sheets, weaker external demand and low 
growth in fixed investment.  In particular, the forecasts contained in this report 
are critically based on the assumption that the European sovereign debt crisis 
is contained and is resolved swiftly.  
 
Unemployment increased sharply in many Euro Area countries in response to 
the crisis but stabilised during mid-2010 as a result of the improvement in 
economic conditions. Mirroring the divergent economic performance of 
different countries, the state of the labour market differs significantly across 
individual Euro Area countries. In Germany, the unemployment rate remained 
almost constant during the recession as the economy reaped the benefits of 
unprecedented wage moderation prior to the crisis. Labour market conditions 
in the Euro Area are expected to remain challenging over the forecast horizon.  
The unemployment rate is forecast to average 9.9 per cent in 2011 before 
falling slightly to 9.7 per cent in 2012. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Output Growth Rate 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4 1.7 1.6 1.7
Inflation Rate (Harmonised) 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.4 1.3 1.5
Unemployment Rate 8.4 7.5 7.6 9.4 10 9.9 9.7
Govt. Balance as % of GDP -1.3 -0.6 -2 -6.3 -6.3 -5.1 -4.3
 
Inflationary pressures in the Euro Area are expected to remain subdued in 
2011. Recent increases in indirect taxes have contributed to a one-off shift in 
the price level. However, this effect is expected to diminish over the course of 
next year. Oil prices are expected to increase only modestly with the result that 
Euro Area inflation is expected to remain below the 2 per cent threshold in 
2011 and 2012. Given the absence of any significant inflationary pressures, the 
main ECB interest rate is projected to remain at its current low level over the 
short-term before starting to rise gradually over the period of the forecast in 
line with the anticipated economic recovery. The main refinancing rate is 
expected to reach 1.1 per cent by the end of 2011 and 1.6 per cent by the end 
of 2012.  
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OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO 
AREA 
Since summer 2009, the world economy has been recovering from the deepest 
and most synchronous recession since the 1930s, supported by strong policy 
measures and a change in inventory accumulation. The rate of recovery, 
however, has been different across the regions. Led by China, the emerging 
economies are growing fast, while most industrialised countries are still 
suffering from the legacy of the crisis. In industrialised countries production is 
generally still below the pre-crisis levels and capacity utilisation consequently is 
low.  
1.1 
Overview 
 
China has already begun to reverse its stimulatory monetary policy, while the 
US and Japan still employ unconventional monetary policy measures in order 
to activate the economy.  In contrast to the latter two economies, the ECB is 
already planning to terminate its transitory unconventional monetary policy 
measures. 
 
The Chinese central bank has already started to raise its steering rate. In Japan, 
the key central bank interest rates are likely to stay low till the end of 2012, 
while the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of England are expected to 
start raising their rates in the forth quarter of 2011. Key bilateral exchange 
rates are assumed to fluctuate close to the level that prevailed in November 
2010. 
 
Regarding fiscal policy, the Chinese stimulus plan is going to end, and in the 
US the results of recent mid-term elections did in effect remove any room of 
manoeuvre. In Japan some additional stimulus has been introduced. The Euro 
Area, countries that have credibility problems due to unsustainable large public 
debts have already begun to balance their public sectors, while most other 
members of the Euro Area are about to start the adjustment process.  
 
Inside the Euro Area, countries are experiencing divergent economic 
developments. While growth is picking up more strongly than expected in 
Germany, the outlook for countries with severe debt and competitiveness 
problems, notably Greece, but also Ireland, Portugal, Spain and to some extent 
Italy, is more subdued. Austerity measures that have been introduced to ensure 
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the sustainability of public finances are depressing their economies in the short 
run. 
 
The transitory Euro Area crisis management mechanisms managed to reassure 
investors only for a short time. The decision to establish a permanent crisis 
mechanism to improve Euro Area governance did not strengthen the stability 
of the financial markets initially as the new mechanism will obviously increase 
private creditors’ burden in the event that a country runs into financial 
difficulties. The current difficulties in Ireland stem from concerns about the 
sustainability of its banking system. The action by the EU and the IMF to 
provide support for Ireland is also designed to prevent the spread of such 
concerns to other Euro Area economies. 
 
Global current account imbalances did improve during the recession, but after 
growth had resumed they started to widen again. The contrasting savings-
investments imbalances in the US and in China call for stronger policy 
measures to support the domestic demand in China and savings in the US.  
 
 
   
1.2 
Global Outlook 1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The recovery from the global economic crisis is losing momentum. Nearly two 
years have passed since world output reached the low point. Since then – early 
2009 – emerging economies have been recovering forcefully; the United States, 
after a strong start, have seen a modest recovery, while in Europe the recovery 
has been wildly uneven. A combination of measures to support financial 
institutions, fiscal stimulus of unprecedented proportions and extremely 
stimulative monetary conditions – all of this on a global scale – has prevented 
the free fall that the world economy experienced in late 2008 and early 2009 
from turning into a prolonged downturn. 
 
The largely policy-driven turnaround was later on supported by a favourable 
turn of the inventory cycle in several major economies. Production rebounded 
first in emerging economies in Asia, which have shown remarkable 
determination and resilience after having been hit hard by the collapse of their 
exports. Many advanced economies started to grow again a few months later. 
In most advanced economies however, output has not yet fully returned to its 
pre-crisis level (Figure 3). In the Euro Area and Japan it still is considerably 
lower, the difference being 3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. In the 
United States on the other hand, GDP is close to the early 2008 level. World 
trade is nearly back were it was when it peaked in April 2008, while world 
industrial production returned to its previous peak level in June of this year 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 1: World Trade, Three Month Moving Average  
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Figure 2: World Industrial Production during the Great Depression in 
the 1930s and the Great Recession 
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World trade and world industrial production (Figure 1 and Figure 2) were 
growing very fast in the beginning of the year, but have been losing 
momentum ever since. In January trade momentum (the rate of growth over 
the previous three months) was 6.3 per cent (non-annualised). In August it was 
1.9 per cent. In the third quarter, import growth in emerging economies has 
come to a virtual halt, whereas during the first half of the year imports of 
emerging economies were driving growth worldwide. Production in China has 
been growing at a breakneck speed. Inflation has been on the rise throughout 
the year and is now substantially above the official target rate of 3 per cent per 
annum. Industrial production growth in China has been slowing gradually 
however and import momentum turned negative in June. The People’s Bank 
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of China has repeatedly raised capital requirements in order to slow bank credit 
growth. In October it raised its policy interest rate by 25 basis points. 
 
Figure 3: Industrial Production by Area 
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In the Euro Area, the financial crisis took a new twist when in Spring several 
governments’ lingering financial difficulties started to mount to the point 
where it became doubtful whether they were capable of solving them without 
outside official support. The weak creditworthiness of private sector parties, 
notably mortgage takers and financial enterprises, had been at the core of the 
financial crisis. Now the crisis of confidence shifted to public sector debt, 
initially centred around Greek government bonds. In May, an initial attempt by 
Euro Area governments, the ECB and the IMF to restore investors’ 
confidence in Greece’s creditworthiness and to contain the crisis to Greece by 
offering it loans amounting to 110 billion euro failed on both accounts. Soon 
the same parties announced a new, much more comprehensive plan, which no 
longer focused exclusively on one country, but which aimed to support Euro 
Area governments facing ‘exceptional circumstances beyond their control’. 
This is now called the European Financial Stability Facility. The ECB took the 
remarkable step of announcing the purchase of sovereign debt at the 
secondary market. At the time of writing, European heads of government are 
struggling to agree on a more permanent set of rules for financial and fiscal 
coordination. This comes at a time when interest rate differentials in Europe 
are breaking previous records.  
 
The global crisis has caused divergences within the Euro Area to widen. When 
GDP growth in the region as a whole turned positive in the third quarter of 
last year, GDP was still declining in Greece, Ireland, and Spain. In Greece it 
has continued to decline in the third quarter of this year. Employment 
outcomes vary wildly, the unemployment rate ranging from 4.4 per cent in the 
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Netherlands to 20.8 per cent in Spain (September figures). Housing market 
conditions also show divergent trends with conditions in Ireland being 
particularly worrying. 
Leading indicators suggest that trade growth will stabilise at a modest rate in 
the fourth quarter. Going forward, indications are that trade growth will 
remain weak in the first half of 2011. Unemployment as well as households’ 
and firms’ efforts to decrease indebtedness will continue to depress aggregate 
demand. Public sector consolidation programs soon will start to bite. 
Governments in many advanced economies have to undo measures taken 
previously to neutralise a huge fall in private sector demand. The seriousness 
of public sector financial stress varies greatly from country to country. The 
aggregate budget deficit in the Euro Area is expected to be 6.3 per cent of 
GDP this year, considerably less than the USA figure, 10.9 per cent, while the 
public debt ratios are at a similar level. Nonetheless, due to the financial 
difficulties of several ‘peripheral’ European countries, the focus of the financial 
crisis is now Europe.  
 
The recently announced new round of quantitative easing in the United States 
is causing concern in major emerging economies such as Brazil and China. 
Monetary authorities fear that a new influx of capital may inflate asset prices. 
This in turn may lead to capital controls or other containment measures. The 
recent G20 summit in Seoul has failed to achieve consensus on the most 
divisive issues: current accounts and exchange rate policy. A full return to 
financial conditions prevailing before the crisis was never to be expected. Risk 
premiums will remain more or less elevated relative to pre-crisis levels. In 
Europe the sovereign debt crisis is obstructing the return of normalcy to 
financial markets. In short, we expect that the gradual weakening of the 
recovery seen in recent months will continue in the near future. World GDP 
growth is expected to accelerate slightly in 2012 as economic conditions 
gradually improve and the economy slowly returns to its potential. 
 
The severe recession in industrialised countries pushed central banks to use 
unconventional measures after key interest rates had been lowered close to 
zero. Banks raised their assets substantially by buying government bonds and 
other instruments either from the markets or also directly from the treasury to 
support the financial system and the liquidity in the markets. While fiscal policy 
is generally turning towards a contractionary stance, monetary policy strategies 
differ. The Federal Reserve introduced a second round of quantitative easing 
in November 2010. Japanese central banks also continue with these measures, 
while the European Central bank has become more careful in using these 
‘transitory’ measures. In contrast with the developed countries, emerging 
economies and China in particular have already suffered from accelerating 
inflation. The authorities in China have already started to cool the economy 
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first by rising capital reserve requirements and, since this autumn, also interest 
rates.  
Core inflation, excluding the energy and food prices, has generally been on a 
declining trend in spite of the strong rebound in commodity prices and strong 
monetary and fiscal policy measures (Figure 4). This reflects partly the low 
capacity utilisation in the economy as a legacy from the recession. In Japan, the 
price level has, like the headline inflation rate, been declining since January 
2009. Core inflation has hovered below 1 per cent in recent months in the US 
and at around 1 per cent in the Euro Area and it is expected to continue to 
moderate. 
 
The US dollar has been rather stable vis-à-vis the Chinese Renminbi, but it has 
fluctuated strongly vis-à-vis the euro reflecting changes in expectations of 
growth, monetary policy and recently the problems in European sovereign 
debt markets. For 2011-2012, the key bilateral rates are expected to remain 
around the level of mid-November 2010. 
 
Figure 4: Core Inflation (excluding food and energy) in Selected 
Countries 
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World non-energy commodity prices in US dollars have risen very strongly 
since reaching their trough in spring 2009. After the recent strong price rise, 
strengthened by the weakening of the US dollar, the average prices of these 
commodities exceeded their previous pre-crisis peak by October 2010. Prices 
expressed in euro have risen even more above the previous peak.  
  
Crude oil prices rose quickly from their lows in winter 2008/9, but unlike non-
energy commodities stayed well below their pre-crisis peak.  Oil prices have 
risen, though markets have been very liquid. Demand from emerging markets 
has been strong, but for e.g. non-OPEC production has risen unexpectedly 
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strongly and has balanced the markets. Oil industry stocks in the OECD 
countries have been above the 2004-2009 average since April 2010. Crude oil 
prices have been supported by the weakening of the US dollar. The forecasts 
in this report are based on the assumption that that oil prices will fluctuate 
around 80-90 dollars per barrel until 2012.  
 
US non-energy commodity prices in October 2010 were more than three times 
higher compared to the lows recorded at end-2001 (Figure 5). Crude oil prices 
were also substantially higher. This significant price level shift is expected to be 
permanent reflecting the rise of the commodity-intensive Chinese economy 
and has consequently worsened the terms of trade of industrialised countries.  
 
Figure 5: US Non-Energy Commodity Prices in US Dollars and Euro 
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1.2.2 RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES 
 
The forecasts contained in this report are subject to high uncertainty. The 
strong policy measures that were adopted prevented a depression, but caused 
sovereign debt to rise to critically high levels in many cases. In the Euro Area, 
Greek Irish and Portuguese bonds carry very high risk premiums in spite of 
recent stability measures (Figure 6). The process of developing a new 
permanent crisis mechanism raised premiums further following the suggestion 
that bondholders could be required share some of the costs of future financial 
rescue packages implemented under such a mechanism.  
 
Since the summer, ongoing concerns about the sustainability of Ireland’s 
banking system has seen increasing reliance on the ECB for liquidity. At the 
Irish governments’ request (on the 21st of November) the EU and the IMF 
are offering significant support to tackle the problems in the banking system 
and to ensure a restoration of order to the public finances (See Box 1). It is 
hoped that this intervention will make clear the EU’s commitment to financial 
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stability and that it will prevent further contagion. Nonetheless, there remains 
considerable uncertainty which, if not resolved, could have a negative impact 
on the Euro Area economy. 
 
If the very rapid rebound of commodity prices from the fall induced by the 
crisis-  continues – as it may if world economic activity proves stronger than 
expected – it may cause inflation problems, in particular in developing 
countries. On the other hand, weaker-than-expected growth could lead to a 
substantial decline in commodity prices. 
 
Finally, the improvement in global imbalances during the crisis proved only 
temporary. Current account imbalances are again growing, in particular in the 
US (deficit) and China (surplus). The recent attempt in the US to activate 
growth by a new round of quantitative easing could improve the situation 
within the country. On the other hand, a depreciation of the US dollar is 
associated with this measure, having already led to a strong appreciation of 
several currencies except the Chinese Renminbi, which has been relatively 
closely tied to the US dollar. This “currency war” could destabilize the 
international financial markets and could also strengthen the euro, which 
recently suffered from the sovereign debt crisis. These tensions also risk the 
revival of trade restrictions. 
 
Figure 6: Ten Year Government Bond Spread versus Germany 
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1.2.3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Asia 
 
Asia has been growing at a very fast pace, thanks to both a rapid recovery of 
trade and the strong reaction of domestic demand to fiscal and monetary 
stimuli, but some signs of deceleration have already emerged in the second and 
third quarters. 
  
In terms of growth pace, Japan was the notable exception, notwithstanding the 
high share of its trade within the region due to the severe contraction in 
domestic demand in the second quarter. The revival of demand in the third 
quarter (GDP grew by 0.9 per cent quarter-on-quarter) is largely attributable to 
last-minute consumption before government stimulus measures expired. A 
negative rebound is likely to occur, and the appreciation of the yen vis à vis the 
dollar (and therefore vis-à- vis the Renminbi) contributes to an unfavourable 
outlook for external demand. Policymakers are trying to further expand the 
fiscal support to the economy with a plan of about €44 billion for employment 
and growth, and the Bank of Japan, after some intervention in the foreign 
exchange market to tackle the yen appreciation and a recent cut in interest 
rates has declared to be ready to expand monetary aggregates. Deflation is an 
issue, as prices are not likely to respond to expansionary policies. 
 
The other Asian countries are facing various challenges. For most of them the 
support of fiscal policy is coming to an end and monetary policy is on a 
tightening path, both to avoid overheating of domestic demand (in many 
countries the inflation rate is increasing towards its target level) and the 
possibility that speculative bubbles may emerge. China and India, the most 
dynamic countries in the region, have already increased interest rates and 
reserve ratio requirements, and other countries are ready to introduce similar 
measures. The dilemma for central bankers is related to the possibility that 
higher interest rates could increase pressures towards an appreciation of their 
national currency, given the already huge amounts of capital inflows (often 
“hot” short term money). The current and expected ultra-low interest rate 
policy of the US (and the monetary policies across industrial countries) is 
blamed for this, even if, given favourable prospects for Asian growth, a certain 
degree of pressure for an appreciation of national currencies is likely to occur. 
On the other side, foreign exchange policies in the area, inclined towards 
defending exchange rate levels judged too depreciated by other world partners, 
are blamed for producing current account imbalances in favour of Asian 
countries. Overall, these reciprocal accusations are producing a lot of political 
tensions and policy reactions, not solved after the G20 meeting in Korea, 
which are feeding the risk of a potentially dangerous “currency war”.   
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United States 
 
Economic growth in the US slowed to 0.4 and 0.6 per cent in the second and 
third quarters of 2010, respectively. This gave rise to some fears that the 
economy might relapse into recession. Indeed, several of the impulses that 
have kept up aggregate demand in the final quarter of 2009 and in early 2010 
are likely to weaken, among them the deceleration of world trade growth; less 
stock-building, as the inventory cycle has reached a more advanced stage; and 
the fading out of fiscal impulses set in 2009.  
 
A more likely outcome than recession is continued moderate growth in 
domestic demand, as observed in the previous quarters. The corporate sector 
has already undertaken major adjustments and productivity has been restored. 
Equipment investment now has expanded for the third consecutive quarter. 
Similarly, private consumption has proven resilient with quarterly growth rates 
of about 0.5 per cent since the beginning of the year. With signs of moderation 
recently, the household savings ratio stood at 5.5 per cent in the third quarter, 
up from 2.2 per cent in 2007 and households balance sheets start recovering.  
 
The moderate growth foreseen will however not resolve quickly high 
unemployment and the continued tensions on housing markets. Both are likely 
to act as a drag on consumption in the forthcoming years. Employment has 
been virtually flat for the last 12 months, and unemployment stands at a rate of 
9.6 per cent. With this situation being prolonged and flows out of 
unemployment being unusually weak, the number of long-term unemployed is 
currently on a marked rise. House prices have more or less stabilised at about 
30 per cent below the peak level of 2006. The situation remains tense, as a 
marked percentage of mortgages exceed the values of house collateral and 
many households therefore still face the risk of foreclosure. Overall, the 
housing market appears to be stuck in an equilibrium of under-utilisation.  
 
With the announcement of asset purchases of 600 billion US Dollar, the 
Federal Reserve Bank has recently set another major monetary impulse, the 
effects of which are still unclear, but gave rise to fears about inflationary 
tendencies. We envisage the federal funds rate to stay close to 1 per cent until 
the end of the forecast horizon and a slight rise in US long-term interest rates 
from currently 2.5 per cent up to 3.2 per cent at the end of 2012. The US 
general government deficit rose to 11.3 percent of GDP in 2009, with the 
public debt ratio of 83.0 percent now broadly matching the Euro Area debt 
ratio. Fiscal policy is expected to be slightly contractionary over the forecast 
horizon as some fiscal measures set in 2009 phase out. 
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We expect real US GDP to expand by 2.1 per cent in 2011 and 2.3 per cent in 
2012. The unemployment rate is expected to decline below 9 per cent only in 
2012. Inflation is forecast to moderate to 1.3 per cent in 2011 and 2012 due to 
low pricing power of producers and the ongoing slack in the labour market. 
Given current budgetary plans, the U.S. budget deficit is expected to decline to 
slightly above 6 per cent by 2012. This implies an increase in government debt 
to close to 100 per cent of GDP. 
 
United Kingdom  
 
The UK economy has continued on a seemingly robust path of recovery, with 
GDP growth of 0.8 per cent into the third quarter of this year 1 . But much of 
this growth over the past year has been driven by the inventory cycle. Whereas 
the performance of net exports have disappointed, providing a drag on 
economic growth. The latest data do suggest net exports have provided a 
positive contribution to GDP growth in the third quarter of this year. But 
given the large negative contributions from net exports in the first half of this 
year, it is domestic rather than external sector that has driven the economy 
forward this year. We expect GDP growth of 1.7 per cent per annum this year. 
 
In 2011 we expect net trade to be the largest contributor to economic growth. 
The rate of growth in the domestic economy is likely to slow sharply. The 
contribution from the inventory is assumed to be minimal. The announced 
fiscal consolidation begins in earnest next year, knocking around ½ percentage 
point from the UK economy’s growth rate through a combination of spending 
cuts, direct tax and VAT increases2 . In addition we expect to see consumer 
spending soften due to the impact of falling real incomes and the wealth effect 
from declining real house prices. Government and household retrenchment 
will pose a significant drag on and almost no contribution to GDP growth, 
respectively next year.  
 
The reliance on external demand for economic growth next year highlights the 
precarious nature of the UK recovery, despite the very robust rates of growth 
we have recently seen. According to the National Institute’s monthly estimate 
of GDP, in October 2010 the UK economy was still around 3.6 per cent below 
its pre-recession peak (March 2008). We do not see the economy returning to 
this pre-recession peak until 2012.  
                                                 
1 This follows GDP growth of 1.2 per cent per quarter in the second quarter of this year. The 
latest revisions to construction output data have yet to be incorporated into estimates of GDP. 
These suggest that GDP growth in the second quarter will be revised down to 1 per cent per 
quarter, ceteris paribus. 
2 The effect on GDP growth is derived from the fiscal multipliers contained within the National 
Institute’s econometric model, NiGEM. For details on these multipliers see Barrell and Kirby 
(2010). 
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The UK labour market has proved to be relatively resilient in the face of such a 
severe recession. The ILO unemployment rate in the UK has remained 
relatively stable at around 7¾ per cent since the start of this year. The robust 
performance in the UK labour market has been attributed, in large part, to the 
sharp adjustment in real wages over the course of the recession. The outlook 
for the labour market is less benign; given the extent of labour hoarding, and 
corresponding sharp fall in productivity it is possible for the UK recovery to 
occur with little job creation.  
 
The government have introduced a more forward-looking fiscal framework 
than the previous administration. The Fiscal Mandate is for the government to 
return the cyclically-adjusted current budget to balance by fiscal year 2015-163 . 
Also in 2015-16 the government’s target is to see net debt, as a share of GDP, 
in decline. The evaluation of the likelihood of achieving this target as well as 
producing the official forecasts have been outsourced to a new independent 
body – the Office for Budget Responsibility. The plans for fiscal consolidation 
in the UK have evolved over the past couple of years 4 . But it is only next year 
that these plans begin to take effect. In 2011 the UK government plans a 
discretionary consolidation equivalent to 2 per cent of GDP. The size of the 
consolidation is planned to rise over the next five years. The planned 
consolidation for fiscal year 2015-16 alone is almost 7 per cent of GDP.  
 
The Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting in November continued 
their ‘wait-and-see’ approach. While economic growth has been robust, there 
are considerable risks to the downside, not least concerns about faltering 
economic activity in the UK’s major trading partners. Unless the UK economy 
falters dramatically we do not expect the MPC to engage a further round of 
quantitative easing. But we do not expect the MPC to tighten policy from 
where is currently is until the second half of next year at least.  
 
CPI inflation is currently more than one percentage point above the target of 2 
per cent per annum. Given the sharp fall in demand over the course of the 
recession this is at first glance surprising. However, temporary factors have 
conspired to elevate the rate of inflation well above target. The sharp 
depreciation of sterling since 2007 has boosted import price growth, and also 
exacerbated the rise in oil prices seen throughout last year. In addition the 
return of the standard rate of VAT to 17.5 per cent following its temporary cut 
pushed up the rate of inflation, perhaps by as much as 1 percentage point in 
2010. 
                                                 
3 The specific requirement is to have the cyclically-adjusted current budget (defined as all current 
receipts less total current expenditure and capital depreciation) in balance by the end of the 
rolling 5-year forecast horizon.  
4 The current consolidation plan contains much of the future tax and spending changes 
announced by the previous government. 
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In our last EFN forecast we expected the rate of inflation to ease back below 
target in 2011. However, June 2010’s Emergency Budget included the 
announcement of a 2.5 percentage point hike in the standard rate of VAT at 
the start of 2011; we expect this to boost the rate of inflation by just over 1 
percentage point, on average, in that year. Although, this is a temporary factor 
and will not force the MPC to begin to tighten policy. It is only in 2012 when 
we expect to see the rate of inflation fall below target. However, much of this 
is simply the base effect from the increase in VAT falling from the calculation. 
It is only in the years beyond 2012 when underlying inflationary pressures are 
likely to be greater, as it is from 2013 onwards when we expect the output gap 
to begin to close. 
Current situation and prospects for NMS  
 
Compared to other emerging markets, the economic recovery in the new EU 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe started relatively late and 
remained modest. The rise in business and consumer confidence has been only 
gradual, but in most countries, households have begun to be less cautious in 
their expenditures. Nevertheless, a high debt burden especially in foreign 
currencies and higher unemployment put severe down-ward pressure on the 
dynamics of private consumption. The banking sector continues to face 
problems on balance sheets because of troubled assets. Therefore, banks 
remain reluctant to lend to consumers or enterprises. Investment activities are 
also hampered by excess capacities. Many countries benefited from the 
moderate recovery in key export markets. In particular, the stimulus programs 
in Euro Area states helped to boost export demand and improve trade 
balances. For example, production in the automotive sectors was stimulated by 
the car scrappage schemes implemented abroad, but this has been only a 
temporary effect. 
 
The Baltics have lost their place as growth leaders in the region and have 
undergone huge economic contractions, as domestic house price bubbles burst 
with capital inflows recorded in the face of massive current account and public 
deficits. Poland is the only economy in Central Eastern Europe with positive, 
albeit low growth even during the global recession. Poland has a large domestic 
market, and households and enterprises have been less burdened with debt 
than elsewhere. Expanding domestic credit and building business and 
consumer confidence had been the major factors behind domestic-demand 
growth in recent years, but the turmoil in international capital markets and an 
increasing risk aversion in the region on the part of foreign investors acted to 
constrain domestic demand. EU-financed investments and public projects for 
EURO-2012 compensated for the contraction of private investment demand. 
In many cases, namely in Latvia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland, the IMF has 
stepped in with agreements on balance-of-payments support to reassure 
  
   OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA 17 
 
investors, maintain confidence in the local currencies, and prevent a sudden 
exodus of short-term capital from the region. 
 
Growth prospects for the CEE are expected to be moderate for the period 
ahead. Exports may be dampened by policies directed towards stronger fiscal 
consolidation in the Euro Area. Moreover the evolution of domestic demand 
is expected to be rather slow as credit markets remain tight and incomes are 
depressed by higher unemployment. In the light of the need to retain foreign 
capital and to counteract large fiscal deficits, monetary and fiscal policies are 
unlikely to be used to stimulate the economies. We expect Poland and Slovakia 
to remain the drivers of economic growth, with the Baltic States catching up at 
a similar pace; Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria will 
rather register lower rates of growth, especially in 2011. 
                    
1.3 Euro Area 
Detail 
EURO AREA FORECAST 
 
In the Euro Area, the recovery from the global economic slump was initially 
slow and bumpy. Real GDP grew by only 0.3 percent per quarter on average in 
the second half of 2009. In the course of 2010 output growth accelerated to an 
average quarterly rate of 0.6 percent over the first three quarters despite the 
sovereign debt crisis which led to significant turbulence in financial markets. 
This pace of recovery is, however, still considered to be modest given the 
depth of the recession before as it is hardly above usual estimates of the 
growth rate of potential output. Moreover, the best part of the current phase 
of the recovery seems to be already behind us.  
 
The preliminary estimate for the third quarter of 0.4 per cent indicates that the 
upsurge in activity which was very much centred on the manufacturing sector 
and led to an increase of GDP by 1 per cent was of a temporary nature. Also, 
the cyclical development was strongly diverse across Euro Area countries. 
When GDP growth in the region as a whole turned positive in the third 
quarter of 2009, GDP was still declining in Greece, Ireland, and Spain. In 
Greece it has continued to decline into the third quarter of this year, when the 
accumulated output loss since the second quarter of 2009 stood at nearly 5 per 
cent. GDP in Ireland is about 2 per cent below its 2009Q2 level, while in Spain 
it is nearly back where it was before the crisis.   
 
In contrast, in Austria, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Slovakia average quarterly GDP growth during the same period has been 
around 1 per cent (non-annualised). The surprise third quarter GDP drop in 
the Netherlands is another reminder that Europe is experiencing a fragile 
recovery. Housing market conditions also show divergent trends, conditions in 
Ireland and Spain being particularly worrying. 
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The acceleration of growth in the Euro Area in the first half of the year was 
primarily due to stronger export growth and a swing in the growth 
contribution of investment into positive territory. While in the first quarter it 
was higher inventories that pulled up GDP, in the second quarter fixed 
investment increased for the first time in two years. Private consumption has 
remained on a modest upward path since summer 2009 and rose by 0.2 per 
cent per quarter. For the third quarter no expenditure breakdown is available at 
the time of writing. Indicators suggest, however, that investment growth has 
moderated from the strong increase seen in the second quarter with 
construction investment having fallen again as the impact of the numerous 
stimulus packages that have been enacted to combat the crisis across the Euro 
Area have started to fade and fiscal consolidation has begun in an increasing 
number of countries. Private consumption is likely to have continued to rise 
slightly, and net exports should have risen further, albeit at a slower pace. 
 
Despite the improvements in production, the situation in the labour market in 
the Euro Area remains bleak. In response to the upturn in production, 
unemployment has merely stabilized at the high level of around 10 per cent in 
the summer 2010, but has most recently started to rise again reflecting the 
moderation of economic growth. Mirroring the different speed of economic 
growth as well as the different extent to which the economies are exposed to 
structural adjustments, the state of the labour market differs strongly across 
individual Euro Area countries. On the positive side, Germany and Austria 
stand out where unemployment has already clearly declined following only 
modest increases during the recession. In Spain and Ireland, the countries in 
which unemployment has risen most dramatically during the crisis, the labour 
market continued to deteriorate. Unemployment continued to increase also in 
France and, not surprisingly, in Greece. 
 
Consumer price inflation in the Euro Area has risen from 1 per cent at the 
start of the year to 1.9 per cent in October. The headline figure currently 
appears to be fully in line with the target of the ECB, which is below but close 
to 2 per cent in the medium term. Part of the increase in inflation is driven by 
prices for food and energy; the core rate of inflation which excludes these 
highly volatile items from the HICP has risen by less and is still close to 1 per 
cent and signals that underlying inflation might still be uncomfortably low. In 
addition, it should be noted that an increasing part of inflation is due to 
increases in indirect taxes and thus represents a one-off shift in the price level 
rather than an increase in the underlying rate of inflation.  
On the Euro Area level, higher consumption taxes contribute 0.3 percentage 
points to the inflation rate according to Eurostat data, but in some countries 
this factor is much more important. For example in Greece, which in recent 
months had the highest rate of inflation in the Euro Area (5.7 per cent in 
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October), almost all of it can be explained by the massive increases in VAT 
and other consumption taxes that where introduced in the course of this year 
as part of the efforts to bring the fiscal situation under control. Indirect taxes 
have also been raised substantially in Spain and Portugal, and as a result 
inflation is currently slightly above the Euro Area average despite the fact that 
wage growth in these countries has slowed down dramatically in response to 
the deterioration in the labour market (and also some structural reforms in the 
labour markets).  
 
Accordingly, the outlook for an improvement of competitiveness in the 
tradable goods sector which is needed in order to facilitate a rebalancing of the 
economies is actually better than the current picture of relative inflation across 
the Euro Area countries suggests. In the course of next year, when the lower 
pre-tax hikes price level drops out of the year-on-year comparison, inflation in 
these countries should drop and given our assumption of only modest further 
rises in oil prices Euro Area inflation is expected to remain well below the 2 
per cent threshold in both 2011 and 2012 at 1.4 and 1.5 per cent, respectively. 
 
The current moderation of the economic recovery is projected to continue 
over the coming quarters. A number of factors suggest that the economy will 
have little momentum for some time going forward. The persistent tension in 
financial markets due to the European sovereign debt crisis certainly is a 
headwind for the recovery in the Euro Area as it has added uncertainty and on 
balance led to a tighter fiscal policy. The extent to which this factor is 
dampening growth is, however, less clear. On the one hand, there is clearly a 
significant negative impact on growth in those countries where rising risk 
premia have raised yields on government bonds and led to drastic fiscal 
tightening. On the other hand, a flight to safety has depressed bond yields in 
the core countries of the Euro Area, most notably in Germany, and 
expectations for monetary tightening of the ECB have shifted outward on the 
time axis.  
 
It is difficult to assess to what extent overall financing costs in the private 
sector have deteriorated in the Euro Area. Fiscal stimuli that are still present in 
some countries will progressively fade and fiscal restriction of substantial 
proportions will be introduced in more and more countries (for an estimate of 
the effect of fiscal policy changes on GDP in the Euro Area and its individual 
countries see the section on Fiscal Policy below). This will curtail public demand 
and restrain private consumption which is forecast to grow by only around 1 
per cent this year and next. Other reasons to expect sluggish private household 
demand are bleak employment prospects – unemployment is forecast to 
remain stubbornly high over the forecast horizon – and the desire of 
households to restore their balance sheets in countries that have experienced 
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the burst of a house price bubble. External demand growth is forecast to 
decelerate markedly due to slower growth in emerging economies in 
combination with ongoing sluggish domestic demand growth in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and a higher external value of the euro. Fixed 
investment is expected to only gradually recover given a still relatively low level 
of capacity utilization.  
 
A distinct feature of the current recovery is that there are pronounced 
differences in growth momentum across countries, which are expected to only 
gradually diminish over the forecast horizon. Due to the massive fiscal 
tightening, 2011 is expected to mark another year of recession in Greece and 
Ireland. Growth is going to remain painfully slow in Spain and Portugal, and 
also Italy is forecast to continue to register subpar growth. Low interest rates 
and world market growth should lead to relatively robust growth in Germany, 
Austria and Finland, as these economies have limited need for structural 
adjustment and are in a better position to benefit from the strong growth of 
demand in emerging economies.  
 
Overall, we expect real GDP to rise by 1.6 per cent in 2011 and 1.7 per cent in 
2012, following an increase of 1.7 per cent this year. With domestic demand 
being compressed in those countries that have built up serious current account 
deficits in the years before the crisis (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) and a 
relative strengthening of domestic demand in the major surplus economies 
(Germany, Netherlands, Finland) the Euro Area economy is projected to 
become more balanced over the forecast horizon. 
 
These growth rates are not significantly above current estimates of growth in 
potential output in spite of the significant slack in the economies and the pre-
crisis level of GDP will not be reached before 2012. There will, however, be 
pronounced differences with respect to level and evolution of the output gap 
across countries – with massive underutilization of resources in countries like 
Spain, Greece or Ireland on the one hand and capacity utilization approaching 
normal levels in Germany on the other hand – complicating the task of the 
ECB of setting monetary policy accordingly. 
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Fiscal Policy  
 
Global fiscal balances deteriorated dramatically in response to the financial 
crisis, reflecting the cyclical downturn as well as policy responses to the crisis 
and structural losses in revenue in some countries, related, for example, to the 
collapse of housing market bubbles. In 2009, all of the Euro Area economies 
breached the 3 per cent deficit ceiling of the Stability and Growth Pact, with 
the exceptions of Finland and Luxembourg, and in many cases public finances 
are expected to deteriorate further in 2010. The average deficit in the Euro 
Area as a whole widened to 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2009, a rise of 5.7 
percentage points since 2007. The financing costs of large deficits, exacerbated 
by the costs of government interventions directly related to the support of 
financial institutions, have induced a sharp rise in the stock of government 
debt. Government debt in the Euro Area as a whole reached 79.2 per cent of 
GDP in 2009, and our projections suggest that by 2012 it will approach 90 per 
cent of GDP. Almost all countries in the Euro Area will exceed the 60 per cent 
of GDP Maastricht limit for government debt. The highest debt burdens are in 
Greece, Italy and Belgium, where government debt will exceed 100 per cent of 
GDP this year. 
 
The need for coordinated fiscal expansions at the height of the crisis has given 
way to the need for credible plans for fiscal consolidation in order to restore 
public finances and ward off upward pressure on financing costs. Sovereign 
debt in several economies has come under severe pressure and fiscal 
consolidation plans were brought forward into 2010 in certain cases. Table 2 
reports the planned fiscal consolidation programmes in the Euro Area 
economies plus the UK, which are underlying this forecast. We investigate the 
impact of these plans on both the fiscal prospects and the outlook for growth 
in the Euro Area through a simulation exercise, using the National Institute 
model, NiGEM.5 
 
We define the policy impulse as the expected impact of legislative changes to 
tax rates and spending commitments introduced in the given year on total 
government spending or revenue, as a per cent of GDP. A positive impulse 
represents an expansion (so a tax cut or a spending increase) whereas a 
negative impulse indicates a contractionary policy. The policy impulses to be 
introduced in each year are split into those that affect revenue and those that 
affect expenditure. Revenue impulses are further subdivided into those derived 
from direct taxation and those derived from indirect taxation. A direct tax 
impulse is effected through a rise in the rate of income tax. This reduces 
personal disposable income and slows the economy through the consumption 
                                                 
5 Further details on NiGEM are available from: 
http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/nigemweb/nigemweb.php . 
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channel. An indirect tax impulse is effected through a rise in the rate of 
consumption tax or VAT. This raises the cost of goods and slows the 
economy through the price channel. Expenditure impulses are subdivided into 
those that affect the volume of government spending on goods, services and 
capital investment, and those that affect personal income through either social 
benefits or public sector wages. A cut in the volume of government spending 
on goods, services or capital expenditure feeds directly onto the level of GDP 
itself, whereas a cut in spending on social benefits or the wage rate of public 
sector employees feeds into personal disposable income, and slows the 
economy through the consumption channel. Public sector wage cuts have 
formed an important part of the programmes in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Fiscal impulses 2010-2012 (positive impulse is a tax cut or an expenditure rise) 
 
  2010 2011 
 
 
2012 
Total 
2010-
2012 
  
Direct 
tax 
Indirect 
tax 
Spending 
(goods 
and 
 services) 
Spending 
(benefits/ 
wages) 
Direc
t tax 
Indirect 
tax 
Spending 
(goods and 
 services) 
Spending 
(benefits/ 
wages) 
Direct 
tax 
Indir
ect 
tax 
Spending 
(goods and 
 services) 
Spending 
(benefits/ 
wages)  
Austria 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 
Belgium -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -1.4 
Finland 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.7 
France -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -2.0 
Germany 0.5 0.4  0.1 0.0 -0.3  -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1  0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Greece -0.2 -0.3 -1.4 -0.5 -1.8 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -1.7 0.0 -7.6 
Ireland -1.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -1.3 0.0 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -8.7 
Italy 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -1.4 
Neths 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -1.7 
Portugal -0.6 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -1.4 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 -5.1 
Spain -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 0.0 -0.9 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 -5.3 
UK -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -4.1 
Euro Area 
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -1.8 
 
 Regardless of the source of the impulse, a fiscal tightening will necessarily slow 
the economy down in the short-term. The magnitude of the impact on GDP, 
the fiscal multiplier, depends on both the instrument used to consolidate 
finances and several key underlying assumptions, such as the degree of forward 
looking behaviour in the economy, the degree of openness in the economy, 
and whether the impulse is temporary or permanent in nature. 
 
The NiGEM model used to run the simulations in this note incorporates the 
following features. Temporary fiscal impulses tend to have larger short-term 
output responses, as there is no significant shift in the underlying interest rate 
path. Permanent fiscal impulses will entail a monetary response eventually, as 
monetary policy is independent of fiscal policy. With forward-looking financial 
markets, expected shifts in the interest rate path induce a shift in long-term real 
interest rates and the exchange rate, offsetting some of the short-term impact 
on output. Spending multipliers tend to be larger than tax multipliers in the 
short-term, as a fraction of any tax change is taken up through savings. 
However, the impact of a tax shift is more protracted, spread out over 3-5 
years. Multipliers tend to be smaller in more open economies, as much of the 
impulse is lost through import leakages. They also depend on the short-term 
income elasticity of consumption, which reflects the tendency to save versus 
spend current income. This is often related to the level of liquidity constraints 
in the economy6 .  
 
The magnitude of fiscal multipliers also depends on whether an impulse is 
introduced on a unilateral bases, or in coordination with other trading partners. 
In Euroframe (2008) we estimated the impact of policy coordination on fiscal 
multipliers in the context of the coordinated fiscal expansion policies. Fiscal 
multipliers were found to be 0.1-0.2 percentage points higher in the larger 
Euro Area countries in response to a coordinated fiscal impulse in the Euro 
Area, US and UK compared to a unilateral fiscal expansion. The same holds 
for fiscal consolidations, and we can expect the fiscal tightening in the US to 
have some negative spillovers to the Euro Area.7 
  
The main forecasts presented in this report include the fiscal policy plans 
outlined in Table 2. We run a counterfactual model simulation to determine an 
ex-ante forecast, based on the assumption that key tax rates and spending 
commitments are held fixed at 2009 levels, implying a zero policy impulse in 
2010-2012. The underlying assumptions of the model simulation include the 
following: financial markets (long-term interest rates, exchange rates and equity 
                                                 
6 See ‘Fiscal multipliers to assess consolidation plans’ in the National Institute Economic 
Review, July 2010, pp. F9-F12 for further discussion and estimates of NiGEM model 
multipliers. This note also compares NiGEM fiscal multipliers to those used by the OECD, the 
IMF, the European Commission and the ECB, which are broadly similar in magnitude. 
7 This is already incorporated into our main forecast scenario. 
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prices) exhibit forward-looking behaviour, consumers exhibit myopic 
behaviour, all consolidation measures are assumed to be permanent. Table 3 
compares the ex-ante scenario under these assumptions to our current forecast 
for the Euro Area.  
 
In the absence of fiscal plans reported in Table 2, GDP growth in the Euro 
Area would have been slightly lower in 2010. While at the Euro Area level the 
fiscal stance is neutral this year, this positive impact on output stems from the 
assumed forward-looking nature of financial markets. The consolidation plans 
for 2011 and 2012 are announced in 2010, and financial market agents take the 
impending tightening of fiscal policy as an indication that the ECB will 
maintain low interest rates for a longer period, as this dampens the outlook for 
inflation over the medium-term (despite the short-term rise in inflation that 
stems from certain rises in indirect tax rates).This allows real long-term interest 
rates to fall by about 0.1 percentage points and the exchange rate to fall in 
effective terms by about 0.9 per cent relative to where it would have been in 
the absence of the consolidation measures, stimulating investment and exports 
relative to the no change in policy scenario. 
 
If we were to run the same scenario with backward-looking expectations in 
financial markets, where exchange rates are unaffected by shifts in the future 
interest rate path and long-term interest rates move in line with current short-
term rates rather than expected short-term rates, their would be no net impact 
on GDP in 2010 at the Euro Area level and no shift in the government budget 
balance between the ex-ante scenario and the final forecast figures for 2010. 
The impact on GDP growth of the consolidation programmes would be 
slightly more contractionary in 2011 (¾ percentage point rather than ½ 
percentage point), as we would miss the offset from the weaker exchange rate 
and decline in long-term interest rates. Alternatively, in a scenario in which a 
fiscal consolidation raises the risk premium on government debt, for example 
if the expected slowdown in growth were to raise doubts about the 
sustainability of the Euro Area, this could more than offset the positive 
stimulus to GDP growth in 2010 exhibited in the current model simulation. 
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Table 3: Euro Area ex ante and post consolidation projections, 
percentage change 
  2010 2011 2012 
  ex-ante 
final 
forecast ex-ante 
final 
forecast ex-ante 
final 
forecast 
Consumption 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.8 1.5 1.1 
Private investment -0.8 -0.4 2.6 2.1 2.5 2.3 
Government expenditure 0.5 0.5 2.8 0.8 1.9 0.3 
Stockbuilding(a) 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total domestic demand 0.7 0.9 2.0 1.2 2.0 1.3 
Export volumes 10.4 10.8 8.9 7.9 5.6 4.8 
Import volumes 9.7 10.2 7.5 5.7 5.3 4.1 
GDP 1.5 1.7 2.1 1.6 2.2 1.7 
Average earnings 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 
Harmonised consumer prices 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 
Private consumption deflator 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.5 
Real personal disposable 
income 0.9 0.8 1.5 0.4 1.5 0.8 
Standardised unemployment 
rate, % 10.0 10.0 9.8 9.9 9.5 9.7 
Govt. balance as % of GDP -6.4 -6.3 -6.2 -5.1 -6.0 -4.3 
Govt. debt as % of GDP 84.9 84.6 88.2 87.3 90.7 89.0 
Current account balance as 
% of GDP -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.8 -0.3 
 
According to our main scenario reported in Table 3, the planned consolidation 
measures for 2011-12 improve public finances in the Euro Area by 1.7 per cent 
of GDP by 2012, indicating that in the absence of these measures we would be 
expecting a Euro Area deficit of 6 per cent of GDP in 2012. However, the 
fiscal tightening comes at a cost in terms of output, slowing GDP growth by 
about ½ percentage point in both 2011 and 2012.  
 
Our final forecast assumptions see government expenditure on goods, services 
and capital equipment growing by 2 percentage points less in 2011 than under 
the ex-ante scenario and by about 1½ percentage points less in 2012. This has 
a strong direct negative impact on GDP in both years, contributing about 60 
per cent to the decline in domestic demand in 2011 and 2012 relative to 
baseline. About 30 per cent of the decline in domestic demand can be 
attributed to lower consumer spending, which stems from income tax rises, 
indirect tax rises and also cuts in spending on social benefits and public sector 
wages. The rest comes from weaker investment growth, which in turn reflects 
the weaker prospects for GDP as a whole. The decline in domestic demand is 
partly offset by a stronger positive contribution from net trade, as import 
demand within the Euro Area falls by more than export demand outside the 
Euro Area, supported by the small improvement in the terms of trade. 
 
Inflation in our final forecast figures is slightly higher in the short-term relative 
to the ex-ante scenario, reflecting indirect tax rises in Greece, Spain and 
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Portugal. This raises Euro Area inflation by about ¼ percentage points in 2010 
and 2011. The impact of indirect tax rises drops out by 2012, when inflation is 
slightly below the ex-ante baseline scenario. 
 
As we discussed above, our model simulations suggest that the planned fiscal 
tightening measures have reduced 10-year government bond yields in the Euro 
Area by about 0.1 percentage points. The fiscal consolidation simulations 
discussed above, however, do not allow for any additional spillovers from the 
improvement of public finances to the risk premium on government debt. As 
illustrates in Figure 6 above (from overview section) the spread on 10-year 
government bond yields remains stubbornly high in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal, despite the austere consolidation programmes detailed in Table 2, 
which point to a cumulative consolidation of 7.6 per cent of GDP in Greece, 
8.7 per cent of GDP in Ireland and 5.1 per cent of GDP in Portugal for 2010-
2012.  
 
Spreads come at a high cost to the taxpayer. According to NiGEM model 
simulations, if spreads were to revert to levels observed in January 2010, this 
would improve the outlook for public finances in Greece by 3½ per cent of 
GDP by 2012, and in Portugal and Ireland by 1½ per cent and ¾ per cent of 
GDP, respectively. Put another way, the recent rise in risk premia could be 
seen as worsening the budget prospects by this amount in these countries, and 
this will have worsened the Area-wide deficit by 0.2 per cent of GDP. 
Reverting to pre-recession levels of government risk premia would allow 
public finances to improve even more rapidly. This would improve the 
government budget balance in Greece by 6 per cent of GDP by 2012, and 
reduce our projection for the Euro Area government deficit in 2012 from 4.3 
per cent of GDP to 3.8 per cent of GDP.  
 
Box 1: Fiscal Consolidation in Ireland 
 
The Irish government has already implemented an ex ante fiscal adjustment of 
2.4 per cent of GDP in 2010 made up of cuts in expenditure and increases in 
taxes as shown in Table 2. They have also announced a programme of €15 
billion in cuts or tax increases (ex ante) spread over the period 2011-14. This 
package is designed to reduce the government’s deficit to around 3 per cent of 
GDP by 2014. 
 
This planned adjustment has also been broadly accepted by the opposition 
parties. The intention of the current government is to introduce a budget on 
7th December, which will implement cuts or tax increases of €6 billion for 
2011. It is also assumed that the 2012 budget will have cuts or tax increases 
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amounting to €4 billion, with the rest of the adjustment taking place in 2013-
14. 
 
Using the ESRI’s HERMES model of the Irish economy it is estimated that an 
illustrative package of expenditure cuts and tax increases of €15 billion would 
have a range of effects on the economy ex post. 
 
GDP would be reduced by a cumulative 4 per cent over the 4 years with higher 
unemployment and emigration as a consequence. The ex post effect on the 
government deficit would be a reduction in the range of 4½  to 5½ per cent of 
GDP which would be sufficient to bring the deficit to close to the 3 per cent 
target by the middle of this decade. In addition, the balance of payments 
surplus would be increased by around 5 per cent of GDP. This latter effect, 
stemming from a substantial reduction in imports and a reallocation of 
resources to the export sector, will transmit some of the effects of the fiscal 
adjustment to Ireland’s EU neighbours, as captured in the simulations using 
the NiGEM model. The fact that the negative effects of such a large package 
on the domestic economy are not greater reflects the openness of the economy 
and the relatively low multiplier. This issue was discussed in Barrell and 
Holland (2010).  
 
Monetary Policy 
 
Money markets have stabilised somewhat in recent months and the unbalanced 
developments in monetary aggregates seen in 2009 and early 2010 now seem to 
be fading out. In the 3rd quarter, growth rates in narrow money M1 decelerated 
markedly to 7 per cent from 11 per cent in the 2nd quarter. At the same time, 
money M3 and loans returned to low positive growth rates again, after declines 
in the first half of the year. Large-scale shifts in the allocation of financial 
assets to instruments outside M3 – such as withdrawals in overnight deposits 
and money market funds - appear to have weakened. Together with some 
increase in money market rates and interest rates on short-term deposits, this 
indicates an, albeit gradual, move towards a less risk-averse attitude in money 
markets. 
 
The ECB's monetary policy has remained expansive. Since May 2009, the main 
refinancing rate has stood at 1 per cent. However, while the US has started 
another round of quantitative easing the ECB has re-iterated its statements that 
it would not delay the planned exit from the non-standard liquidity provision 
schemes set up in 2009. It has also stated that it will remain very cautious with 
purchases of government bonds of Euro Area member states. Given the 
moderate growth outlook and continued low inflationary pressure, we expect a 
very gradual tightening in the course of 2011.  
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We foresee the ECB to begin raising the main refinancing rate by the end of 
2011 and for it to reach close to 2.0 per cent by the end of 2012. The forecast 
assumes a gradual rise in average Euro Area long-term interest rates from the 
current rate of about 3 per cent to 3.7 per cent by the end of 2012. Further, it 
assumes that bilateral exchange rates between major currencies will remain 
broadly unchanged over the forecast horizon from the levels in November 
2010. 
 
Clearly, continued turbulences on financial markets and sovereign debt issues 
are an important source of risk to the assumptions on interest and exchange 
rates. The average Euro Area long-term rate currently hides large divergences 
in risk premia across the Euro Area. Yields on AAA-rated government bond 
yields declined to about 2.5 per cent in recent months, while risk aversion on 
government bond markets has continued to increase. With the upturn in Euro 
Area economic activity and the announcement of quantitative easing in the 
U.S., the euro had reversed about half of its earlier decline earlier since June 
and recently stood at about 1.35 vis-à-vis the US Dollar. However, the euro 
started to decline again with the re-emergence of sovereign debt issues, the full 
effects of which remain to be seen. 
 
GERMANY  
 
In the course of 2010, the economic recovery in Germany proceeded much 
faster than expected. Output growth accelerated strongly in the first half of the 
year. The second quarter showed the highest quarterly growth rate since 
German unification (2.3 per cent). In line with expectations, real GDP 
increased at a lower pace in the third quarter (0.7 per cent), but exceeded again 
the expansion of potential output. Exports have been the main growth engine 
of the upturn so far. They recovered at an exceptional speed and almost 
reached their pre-crisis level in the third quarter of 2010. The brightening 
outlook for exports triggered a substantial rebound in investment in machinery 
and equipment, although its level is still 15 per cent below the peak in summer 
2008. In addition, investment in structures and private consumption both have 
improved, although only modestly. Overall, the development of domestic 
demand will account for two thirds of the real GDP increase in the current 
year.  
 
During the crisis, the German job market has shown a remarkable degree of 
robustness. On average, unemployment increased only slightly during the 
crisis, especially in some export led sectors, but started to decline as soon as 
the free fall of the economy appeared to be stopped in spring 2009. In late 
summer 2010 unemployment fell below the level registered before the crisis – 
the lowest numbers since 1992. The exceptionally good performance of the 
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German labour market, both in an international comparison and relative to 
labour market responses in previous recessions cannot be explained by the 
extensive use of short-time work. It is rather the result of structural reforms 
which led to wage moderation on the macro level and facilitated agreements 
that raised the potential at the firm level to flexibly adjust working time and 
wage levels in response to the crisis. Moreover, the nature of the recent 
recession has been largely confined to industry and perceived as a temporary 
demand shock (see Box 2).  
 
Public finances did not deteriorate as severely as in many other industrial 
countries during the crisis although the recession was deep by international 
standards and despite the fact that the government enacted sizeable stimulus 
programs. Revenues were not as strongly affected as the recession was not 
associated with a collapse in the housing market and employment held up 
relatively well. The vigorous recovery should help to confine this year’s general 
government deficit to around 4 per cent of GDP. The next year will mark the 
entry into a consolidation process which is scheduled to result in a more or less 
balanced budget in terms of the structural component by 2016, at least at the 
federal level. 8  A number of measures will help to reduce the structural deficit 
by around 0.5 percentage points: Social security contribution rates will be 
increased by 0.7 percentage points (health insurance: 0.5; unemployment 
insurance: 0.2); most of the measures taken as part of various stimulus 
programs will end in 2011, especially extra spending on public investment, 
reduction of corporate taxes and extra spending on short-time working plans; 
revenue increases through the introduction of taxes on air traffic and nuclear 
fuel, reduction of tax deductions for energy intensive industries and increase in 
the tobacco tax. The process of consolidation is to be continued in 2012, 
although we expect only a small reduction in the structural budget deficit.  
 
While economic sentiment indicators suggest that there is still a significant 
momentum in the economy, we expect GDP growth to decelerate substantially 
over the quarters ahead. The high growth in recent quarters has to be seen 
against the huge drop in production in previous quarters and could be regarded 
as a temporary phenomenon after the crisis. Dampening factors include much 
more moderate increases in external demand combined with a euro 
appreciation, a change of the orientation of fiscal policy from stimulatory to 
restrictive, and a turnaround in the inventory cycle.  
 
Domestic demand should, however, continue to expand at relatively robust 
rates supported by an environment of low interest rates, declining 
                                                 
8 The so-called debt brake which has been introduced into the constitution requires the federal 
government to run a structural budget deficit of less than 0.35 percent of GDP by 2016. State 
governments have to balance their budgets by 2020. 
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unemployment and rising wages. In particular, private consumption is expected 
to become a stronger driver of growth. Net exports on the other hand will 
contribute much less to growth than in 2010 and could even become a drag on 
growth over the forecast horizon as rebalancing within the Euro Area is 
expected to proceed.  
 
For 2011 we forecast real GDP growth of 2.1 per cent, following exceptionally 
strong growth of 3.6 per cent in 2010. While the headline figure for 2012 is 
slightly less than 2011, this does not imply a further deceleration of growth 
within the year as the annual growth rate for 2011 is lifted by a high statistical 
carry-over from the current year. Unemployment is expected to decline further 
to below 3 million for the first time in almost two decades. Inflation, which has 
crept up during 2010 mainly due to higher prices for food and energy should 
continue to gradually rise, with higher labour costs becoming more and more 
important. 
 
Box 2: Can short-time work explain the German labour market 
miracle?9 
While OECD countries on average experienced a rise in unemployment from 
peak to trough of roughly 3 percentage points, the unemployment rate in 
Germany stayed almost constant during the Great Recession, although 
German industry faced a disproportionally large drop in production. It is often 
argued that the German short-time work scheme prevented unemployment 
from rising, leading to a massive drop in productivity and working time. If this 
was really at the heart of the story, the intervention of the government would 
simply have postponed a more unpleasant state of the labour market or, at 
least, would have resulted in a protracted period of jobless recovery. However, 
since the end of 2009 employment has been rising and unemployment was 
falling even before that, while at the same time short-time work has been 
reduced.  
 
Therefore short-time work does not provide a sufficient explanation for the 
good state of the German labour market. First, virtually every recession since 
the early 1970s was accompanied by a sharp rise in the number of short-time 
workers, the only exception being the recession following the burst of the 
dotcom bubble after 2000 (Figure B1) and only after this recession 
unemployment fell below pre-recession levels so quickly. Furthermore, short-
time work is not a German speciality. It is common in many other 
industrialised countries. Figure B2 depicts the increase in the relative number 
of short-time workers between 2007 and 2009. Italy, Belgium, Japan and 
                                                 
9 This box was written by Dominik Groll (IfW Kiel). For a more detailed analysis on the factors 
behind the extraordinary German labour market response in the Great Recession, see Möller 
(2010) and Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll (2010). 
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Luxembourg exhibited a rise in the share of short-time workers comparable to 
that in Germany. The biggest expansion of short-time work took place in 
Turkey. Thus, relative to total employment the number of short-time workers 
in Germany was neither exceptionally high compared to previous recessions 
nor compared to other industrialised countries during the recent recession.  
 
The most important factor behind the labour market success rather was the 
unprecedented real wage moderation prior to the Great Recession (Figure B3). 
This stimulated labour demand enormously. Consequently, unemployment 
declined significantly between 2005 and 2008. For the first time since the 
1970s, unemployment fell below its level before the previous recession. The 
far-reaching labour market reforms between 2003 and 2005 are a very 
important factor in explaining wage moderation and, thus, the reduction in 
unemployment. By increasing the incentives to take up employment and by 
deregulating certain segments of the labour market, the labour market reforms 
put downward pressure on wages and reduced the structural unemployment 
rate. When Germany faced the collapse of foreign demand with the onset of 
the Great Recession, the transition to the new equilibrium with lower 
unemployment had not been completed, according to our calculations. The 
underlying process of ongoing transition dampened the visible effects of the 
recession for the labour market considerably. 
 
A second central factor in explaining the German labour market performance 
during the Great Recession is the fact that the amount of labour hoarding by 
firms was unprecedented. This becomes clear when comparing the evolution 
of real GDP with hours worked and employment (Figure B4). First, hours 
worked were reduced considerably less than GDP which led to a massive 
deterioration of hourly productivity. Second, employment decreased by far less 
than hours worked reflecting a reduction in average working time. Firms 
resorted to labour hoarding much more than in previous recessions for two 
reasons. On the one hand, firms were able to hoard labour to a greater extent 
due to the wage moderation itself and due to increased flexibility in adjusting 
working time. Here, short-time work can only account for roughly one third of 
the working time reduction during the crisis (IAB 2010). The rest is due to 
employer-initiated working time reductions provided for by collective 
agreements, reducing over-time, and debiting long-term working-time 
accounts. On the other hand, firms were more willing to hoard labour because 
they have been increasingly suffering from a shortage of skilled workers and 
because the recession was perceived as being predominantly exogenous and – 
at least to a large part –temporary. This stands in contrast to many other 
countries where the crisis marked the start of a period of structural adjustment 
correcting imbalances that had developed before, such as reducing an 
oversized building sector in response to the burst of a property bubble. 
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Figure B1: Share of Short-time Workers 1970-2010 
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Figure B2: Increase in the Share of Short-Time Workers 2007-2009 
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Figure B3: Real Hourly Gross Wage 
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Figure B4: Adjustment in the German Labour Market  
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FRANCE  
 
French GDP grew by 0.4 per cent in the third quarter of 2010 according to the 
first set of quarterly national accounts released on 12th November 2010. This 
was the sixth quarter of positive growth in a row and means GDP has risen by 
2.2 per cent since the second quarter of 2009. However, GDP remains 1.8 per 
cent below its level of the first quarter of 2008. Although French GDP 
performed better than the Euro Area average during the crisis, and noticeably 
better than Germany, the French recovery is also less rapid than in Germany. 
 
In manufacturing industry, output rose by 0.7 per cent in the third quarter of 
2010 but was still 12.7 per cent below the level of early 2009. Business survey 
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results in the industry and services sectors have regularly improved since 
Spring 2009 and stood above their long-term averages in September 2010. 
Households’ confidence stopped falling from August 2010 and has remained 
close to its long-run average. Latest survey data suggest that GDP will grow by 
around 0.6 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2010.  
 
The recovery of the French economy initially benefited from the support of 
the fiscal package implemented in response to the crisis. From the second 
quarter of 2010, inventories provided a clear positive contribution to GDP 
growth of 0.6 percentage points in the second quarter and 0.3 percentage 
points in the third quarter respectively. Private investment, both for companies 
and households stopped falling in the second quarter of 2010 and started to 
grow at a moderate pace (0.7 per cent per quarter on average). With 
households’ consumption rising by around 0.5 per cent per quarter, domestic 
demand continues to be the only driver of French GDP growth, while net 
exports have reduced GDP growth by 0.5 percentage point both in the second 
and the third quarter of the year.  
 
The crisis has led to a rapid deterioration of public finances and fiscal 
consolidation will be implemented from 2011 in France as in many advanced 
economies. French general government borrowing will have increased by 5 
percentage points of GDP between 2007 and 2010 while government debt 
rose by 19 percentage points of GDP. Fiscal policy provided an impulse of 2 
per cent of GDP in 2009 but became neutral in 2010, and we expect it to be 
restrictive in 2011 (-1.4 per cent of GDP) and 2012 (-0.8 per cent of GDP). 
The government has set the ambitious target of bringing the deficit from 7.7 
per cent of GDP in 2010 to 3 per cent of GDP in 2013. In 2011, a major 
component of fiscal consolidation will be the abolition of a number of tax 
expenditures (so-called ‘niches fiscales), by around 0.5 per cent of GDP, and 
which will bear both on companies and households. The government also 
plans to restrict public spending growth to 0.5 per cent only per annum, well 
below the average of the last 10 years (2.0 per cent per annum). 
 
Fiscal consolidation comes at a time when the French economy is far from 
having fully recovered from the crisis. The rate of unemployment rose from 
7.6 per cent in early 2008 to 10 per cent in August 2010 (in terms of 
EUROSTAT harmonised rate). Inflation as measured by the HICP stood at 
1.8 per cent in October 2010 up from -0.8 per cent in July 2009 when it 
reached its last trough, but deflationary pressures are at work, with inflation 
excluding energy, food and tobacco products having decelerated over that 
period from 1.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent, and likely to come close to 0 per cent 
in 2011.  
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From 2011 on, the positive impacts of inventory cycle will be over and fiscal 
policy will be tightened. In a situation of high unemployment and large 
uncertainties about the short-term outlook, we expect households’ 
consumption growth to remain modest over the forecasting horizon (ca. 1.6 
per cent per annum), well below the average of the last 10 years (2.6 per cent 
per annum). Company investment growth will remain modest until excessive 
production capacities disappear. French exporters succeeded in stabilising their 
export market shares since the beginning of 2010, but the recent rise of the 
euro effective exchange rate, which we expect to remain roughly unchanged 
over the two coming years and world trade deceleration will reduce exports 
growth. Net exports will keep on reducing French GDP growth over the 
forecasting horizon. French GDP is projected to grow by around 1.7 per cent 
per annum in 2011 and 2012.  
ITALY  
 
The economic recovery is losing momentum in Italy in common with the 
situation in other Euro Area countries. Whereas GDP grew by 0.4 and 0.5 per 
cent quarter-on-quarter in the first half of the year, the recently released 
estimate for the third quarter signalled a marked deceleration to 0.2 per cent 
quarter-on-quarter. Industrial production decelerated as well, from 2 per cent 
in the second quarter to 1.3 in the third. In September, industrial production 
decreased by 2.1 percentage points month-on-month, and the index is still 18.5 
percentage points below the 2008 peak. Due to low business and consumer 
confidence, we expect a further deceleration for the last month of this year, 
keeping the year-on-year GDP increase for 2010 at 1 per cent, below the Euro 
Area average. 
 
The upturn in economic activity has not been strong enough to reverse the 
negative trend in employment. Provisional data indicate no significant 
improvement in the third quarter: the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate 
is 8.3 per cent, while the number of hours of wage supplementation has 
diminished slightly but it is still at a historically high level. 
 
Twelve-month consumer price inflation doubled in the first six months of the 
year (from 0.7 to 1.4 per cent), driven by an increase in energy prices. In 
October it reached 1.7 per cent. Since the beginning of the year the twelve-
month increase in the prices of non-food and non-energy goods has held 
below 1 per cent, and service price inflation has remained historically low. 
 
Reacting to the severe tensions on the government bond markets of some 
euro-area countries, the Government has brought forward Italy's budgetary 
adjustment measures to ensure attainment of its objectives. The measures 
amount to €12 billion in 2011 and further €13 billion in 2012. In this way the 
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net borrowing is expected to be reduced by €12 billion in 2011 and by €25 
billion in 2012 and 2013 compared with that on a current legislation basis, in 
order to achieve the public finance targets indicated in the Stability 
Programme, that is a deficit to GDP ratio of 3.9 per cent in 2011 and 2.7 per 
cent in 2012. The adjustment will come mainly from the lower expenditures 
envisaged by the package (current expenditures especially, deriving from the 
freeze in civil servant wage increase for the next three years, and the reduction 
imposed on budgets of local governments), while only one third of the 
correction will come from revenue measures (mainly from the fight against tax 
avoidance and tax evasion). In 2011 and 2012 fiscal policy is expected to 
become restrictive and, according to Government estimates, the expected 
impact on GDP is around 0.3 percentage points and 0.5 percentage points 
respectively. 
 
Both this year and in 2011 the recovery is likely to be sustained by export 
demand, as in similar cyclical phases in the past. Nevertheless, as we expect 
world trade to expand less rapidly the next two years, export growth is likely to 
be lower in 2011 and 2012 in comparison to this year. In addition, the 
dampening effect of the budgetary adjustment will keep domestic demand 
weak, with household consumption and investment in machinery and 
equipment growth modest. Construction investment is held down by the still 
ample spare capacity. All in all, this will result in a slowdown in economic 
activity compared with the first six months of this year. Driven by the 
appreciation of the euro, inflation will reach 1.4 per cent in 2011, down from 
1.6 per cent this year. We expect a slow improvement in the labour market, 
mainly driven by a reduction in the number of hours of wage supplementation, 
whereas employment and the unemployment rate are projected to continue to 
worsen next year. 
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FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
  Annex Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areaa 
        
 
 
 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Output Growth Rate 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4 1.7 1.6 1.7 
Inflation Rate 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 
Unemployment Rate 8.4 7.5 7.6 9.4 10 9.9 9.7 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -1.3 -0.6 -2 -6.3 -6.3 -5.1 -4.3 
 
Annex Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD China EU-27
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2006 5.1 3.1 11.2 3.3 3.2 2.7 2 3.6 2.4 2.1 2.8
2007 5.2 2.7 13.2 3 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.8 2.3 1.4 2.7
2008 3 0.3 9.3 0.4 0.3 0 -1.2 0.7 0.1 -1.3 -0.1
2009 -0.6 -3.4 8.9 -4.2 -4 -2.6 -5.3 -4.7 -2.5 -5.1 -5
2010 4.8 2.8 10.2 1.8 1.7 2.6 3.6 3.6 1.6 1 1.7
2011 4.2 2.2 9.1 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.1 2.1 1.6 1 1.7
2012 4.2 2.2 9 1.9 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.9
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 
 OECD EU-15 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2006 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.7 -0.2 1.1 2.1 2.7 2.7 
2007 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.7 -0.6 1.8 2 2.3 2.9 
2008 2.9 2.7 2.7 3.3 0.4 1.7 2.9 3.2 3.1 
2009 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -2.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.2 1.2 
2010 1.6 2 1.5 1.7 -1.9 1.7 1.2 1.5 4.6 
2011 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.3 -0.9 1.5 1.1 1.4 3.4 
2012 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.1 1.8 1 1.4 1.4 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 
World trade 
volume 
World export 
prices in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a
 Annual percentage changes 
2006 9.4 2.4 63.4 
2007 7.3 5.8 70.5 
2008 2.8 5.6 95.7 
2009 -11 -8.1 61.8 
2010 13 3.2 77 
2011 8.6 7 81 
2012 5.8 3.2 85.7 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil prices. 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Interest Rates 
 
 
Short-term interest 
rates  
Long-term interest 
rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan
Euro 
Area UK 
2007 5.1 0.5 3.8 5.5 4.6 1.7 4.3 5 
2008 2.1 0.5 3.9 4.7 3.6 1.5 4.2 4.5 
2009 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.6 3.2 1.3 3.7 3.7 
2010 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 3.1 1.1 3.3 3.5 
2011 0.3 0.1 1 0.6 2.8 1 3.3 3.2 
2012 0.8 0.2 1.4 0.8 3.1 1.2 3.6 3.4 
   
2009Q1 0.3 0.1 2 1.1 2.7 1.3 3.7 3.5 
2009Q2 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.5 3.3 1.4 3.9 3.6 
2009Q3 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 3.5 1.3 3.7 3.8 
2009Q4 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 3.5 1.3 3.6 3.8 
   
2010Q1 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 3.7 1.3 3.5 4.1 
2010Q2 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 3.5 1.3 3.4 3.7 
2010Q3 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 2.8 1 3.1 3.2 
2010Q4 0.3 0 1 0.5 2.5 0.9 3 3 
   
2011Q1 0.3 0 1 0.5 2.6 0.9 3.1 3.1 
2011Q2 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 2.7 1 3.2 3.1 
2011Q3 0.3 0.1 1 0.5 2.8 1 3.3 3.2 
2011Q4 0.4 0.1 1.1 0.7 2.9 1.1 3.4 3.2 
   
2012Q1 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.8 3 1.1 3.5 3.3 
2012Q2 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.8 3.1 1.2 3.6 3.4 
2012Q3 0.8 0.2 1.5 0.8 3.1 1.2 3.7 3.4 
2012Q4 0.9 0.2 1.6 0.8 3.2 1.3 3.7 3.5 
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2007 -4.6 -4.7 3.7 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.1
2008 -1.9 12.9 5.7 2 2.6 2.5 -11.9
2009 7 15.5 5.2 2.4 1.7 2.4 -10.5
2010 -3.1 4.4 -5.4 -3.4 -2.7 -3.1 -0.3
2011 -2.3 4.2 2.3 1 1.1 1.4 -0.1
2012 1 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6
 
 
Annex Table 7: Bilateral Exchange Rates 
 
 
Bilateral rate against US Dollar 
 
 Yen Euro Sterling 
2007 117.8 0.731 0.5 
2008 103.4 0.683 0.545 
2009 93.6 0.72 0.641 
2010 87.8 0.751 0.646 
2011 82.8 0.718 0.627
2012 82.9 0.721 0.628
    
2009Q1 93.6 0.768 0.697 
2009Q2 97.3 0.735 0.645 
2009Q3 93.6 0.699 0.609 
2009Q4 89.8 0.677 0.612 
    
2010Q1 90.7 0.722 0.641 
2010Q2 92 0.787 0.671 
2010Q3 85.7 0.775 0.645 
2010Q4 82.9 0.721 0.629 
    
2011Q1 82.8 0.718 0.627 
2011Q2 82.8 0.717 0.627 
2011Q3 82.8 0.717 0.626 
2011Q4 82.9 0.719 0.628 
    
2012Q1 82.9 0.72 0.628 
2012Q2 82.8 0.72 0.628 
2012Q3 83 0.721 0.628 
2012Q4 82.9 0.722 0.628 
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Annex Table 8: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Annual Percentage Changes 
Volumes  
Consumption  2.2 1.7 0.4 -1.1 0.6 0.8 1.1
Private investment  6.4 4.9 -1.1 -13.4 -0.4 2.1 2.3
Government expenditure  2 2.2 2.2 2.7 0.5 0.8 0.3
Stockbuildingb  0 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1
Total domestic demand  2.9 2.5 0.3 -3.3 0.9 1.2 1.3
Export volumes  8.8 6.3 0.7 -13.1 10.8 7.9 4.8
Import volumes  8.7 5.8 0.6 -11.8 10.2 5.7 4.1
GDP  3.2 2.8 0.3 -4 1.7 1.6 1.7
Average earnings  2.3 2 3.1 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.8
Harmonised consumer prices  2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.4 1.3 1.5
Private consumption deflator  2.2 2.3 2.7 -0.2 1.5 1.4 1.5
Real personal disposable income  1.8 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.8
   Levels 
Standardised unemployment %   8.4 7.5 7.6 9.4 10 9.9 9.7
Government financial balancec  -1.3 -0.6 -2 -6.3 -6.3 -5.1 -4.3
Government debtc  68.6 66.4 69.8 79.2 84.6 87.3 89
Current accountc  -0.1 0.1 -1.5 -0.6 -1 0.1 -0.3
  
c As a percentage of GDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
